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We theorized that competitive victimhood – the tendency to see one’s ingroup 
as having suffered more than the outgroup as a result of a prolong conflict– may 
function strategically as a psychological mechanism to justify violent actions against 
the outgroup under high (versus low) realistic threat. Focusing on the Jewish-Israeli 
perspective in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the present study supports this argument 
by demonstrating the positive relationship between competitive victimhood and 
justifying both direct and structural violence against Palestinians following high (vs. 
low) realistic threat. Theoretical and applied implications for conflict resolution are 
discussed.   
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Threatened Hence Justified: Jewish Israelis’ Use of Competitive Victimhood to 
Justify Violence Against Palestinians 
Societies involved in protracted conflicts are forced to live under challenging 
conditions often characterized by violence, physical danger, and loss of life (Bar-Tal, 
2013; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2006). A consequence of these conditions is that conflicting 
group members view their ingroup as the only legitimate victims, while deeming the 
adversarial group as the illegitimate perpetrators of unjust and immoral injustices 
(Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & 
Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). The tendency to see one’s own group 
having suffered more than the harmed outgroup can be psychologically powerful and 
lead to maintaining the conflict. This phenomenon, coined as competitive victimhood 
(CV; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012) and considered as a common form of 
conflict-specific exclusive victim consciousness (i.e., individuals’ narrow focus on 
how their group has suffered in distinct and unique ways; Vollhardt, 2015, Vollhardt 
& Bilali, 2015; see also Noor, Vollhardt, Mari, & Nadler, 2017), has been shown to 
predict anti-social and anti-conciliatory intergroup outcomes in violent conflicts (i.e., 
physically harming other groups with intent) but also in structural conflicts (i.e., 
harming others as a result of systematic inequalities and injustices in society) across 
the world, such as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Chile, and the U.S. (Noor, 
Brown, Gonzalez, et al., 2008; Noor et al., 2008; Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013; 
Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, and Rothschild, 2012). Although there is a growing 
body of empirical work about the impact of CV on intergroup relations (Noor et al., 
2012; Young & Sullivan, 2016), little is known about what motivates conflicting 
groups to engage in CV, especially in contexts of asymmetrical intergroup power 
relations and where conflicting groups are motivated to restore their power and 




morality (Kahlon, Shnabel, Halabi, &  Simantov-Nachleili, 2019). The present paper 
focuses on addressing this question from the perspective of the Jewish Israelis who in 
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitute the high-power side with 
superior access to military and economic powers, among others (Levanon & Raviv, 
2007).  
Competing over victimhood status may appear paradoxical, especially when 
considered from the high-power group’s perspective. This paradox is apparent given 
that victimhood is typically associated with low agency, stigma, and humiliation 
(Gray & Wegner, 2009; Lindner, 2006; Noor et al., 2017). From this perspective, it 
may appear particularly odd for high-power groups to engage in CV. Past research has 
partially addressed this paradox by indicating that CV may serve both high- and low-
power groups as a strategy to protect their ingroup from being accused of moral 
wrongdoings. Sullivan and colleagues (2012) showed that both, for example, men and 
women utilized CV when their respective ingroups were being accused of injustice, 
such as discrimination. In other words, these researchers demonstrated that CV may 
serve as a strategy to protect and restore the threatened moral identity of groups 
following accusations that they may have harmed other groups unjustly.  
Notwithstanding the validity of this research, in the present study we argue 
that to guard against symbolic threat to one’s moral identity is only one motivational 
source for group to engage in CV. In contexts of intergroup conflict marked by direct 
violence, however, realistic threats to one’s person, family, and ingroup may 
constitute yet another important motivation for groups to compete over their 
victimhood. Indeed, because of the tangible nature of realistic threat, the suffering of 
one’s own ingroup may not only appear as real and imminent, but such suffering in 
turn may also lead to perceptions of the outgroup as the provocateurs who are 




deserving of ingroup’s wrath and subsequent punitiveness (Noor et al., 2008). Past 
research has also investigated factors that might facilitate the reduction of CV. For 
example, Shnabel and colleagues (2013) demonstrated the importance of common 
shared victimhood – the notion that both conflicting groups have suffered equally – 
reduced both Israelis and Palestinians’ tendency to engage in competitive victimhood 
and, in turn, lead to increased intergroup reconciliation attitudes. Similarly, Adelman, 
Leidner, Ünal , Nahhas and Shnabel (2016) showed that exposure to an inclusive 
narrative that acknowledged both ingroup and outgroup’s suffering led a reduction in 
competitive victimhood and, in turn, reduced support for aggressive policies—but 
only when people were relatively less concerned that acknowledgment of outgroup 
suffering might risk loss of third-party support. We acknowledge the novel 
contributions of past literature, and intend to extend it in the current study by 
examining a factor (i.e., realistic threat) that may feed the need for competitive 
victimhood and fuel aggression against the outgroup. 
Put differently, the present study expands past research by testing the notion 
that realistic threat may motivate high-power groups (Israeli Jews) to engage in CV, 
which in turn may motivate them to justify punitive, “no-choice” actions against their 
low-power outgroup (Palestinians). It is worth noting that our focus was on realistic 
threat because of the nature of our chosen research context, namely the ongoing 
violent intergroup conflict between Israel and Palestine. We reasoned that realistic 
threat would be a particularly relevant variable to influence competitive victimhood 
perceptions because such realistic threat would make the salience of harm inflicted by 
the outgroup on the ingroup potentially more real and tangible. Moreover, we 
expected that such tangible threats to the self, one’s family, and ingroup members, 
would likely cloud and distort individuals’ perception of their ingroup suffering in 




spite of belonging to the high-powered side of the conflict and having inflicted more 
disproportionate harm onto the outgroup, thereby inducing competitive victimhood. 
To test this, we report an experiment in which we manipulated realistic threat and 
subsequently measured its effect on Israeli-Jewish participants’ motivation for CV, as 
well as their endorsement of punitive actions against Palestinians.  
According to integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; 2000; 
Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2008), threat emanates from experiencing a challenge to 
one’s goals and well-being. Reactions towards such threats are predominantly 
negative. Threat at the individual and intergroup levels may invoke negative 
behaviors towards its source that range from aggression, hostility and discrimination 
to warfare and other forms of open conflict (Stephan, et al., 2008; Stephan, Ybarra, 
Rios, 2015). ITT distinguishes between different categories of threat. Realistic threat 
typically involves risk of harm to one’s physical well-being (e.g., physical attack and 
death), while symbolic threat poses harm to one’s psychological well-being (e.g., 
anxiety, negative expectations, and uncertainty). Crucially, according to meta-
analytical evidence, each type of threat uniquely predicts negative reactions toward 
the individuals and groups closely associated with the source of threat (Riek, Mania, 
& Gaertner, 2006). Although the relationship between threat and negative responses 
has been extensively studied (Stephan & Stephan, 2017), the current research focuses 
on CV, a relatively new construct, as a possible mechanism which may mediate this 
relationship between realistic threat and high-power group members’ support for 
future punitiveness against the low-power group.  
Indeed, past research has reported correlational evidence in support of the 
positive association between perceptions of victimization and threat against the 
ingroup and its violence towards the outgroup. For example, Bar-Tal and Antebi’s 




(1992) correlational study, conducted among Israelis, showed that increased threat 
and victimization perceptions were significantly and positively associated with 
exacerbating attitudes towards the conflict. That is, when feeling threatened, the high 
power group members, Jewish-Israelis, reported more fear and more de-legitimization 
of the Palestinians and their leaders, and, importantly, reported more tendency for 
self-perception of victimhood (see also Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). Likewise, again 
among Israelis, perceived vulnerability of the ingroup was significantly and positively 
associated with support for extreme military actions against Palestinians in the West 
Bank (Maoz & Eidelson, 2007). Although the reviewed research is correlational, it 
does highlight that actual physical threat to one’s group may foster an increased 
awareness regarding the collective belief that the ingroup has suffered more than the 
outgroup, and such threat may also predict support for future violence against the 
latter.  
Building on past theorizing and research, the present work we pursued several 
aims. First, we intended to experimentally test that realistic threat might induce the 
high-power group with an increased sense of CV. Second, we also wanted to examine 
and replicate that realistic threat would lead to the endorsement and justification of 
harsh retaliatory aggression (Stephan et al., 2015). Third, a further contribution of the 
present work focused on investigating whether increased tendency for competitive 
victimhood might serve as a mediating mechanism in the relationship between 
realistic threat and justification of aggression against the outgroup. The present work 
was also informed by Galtung’s (1969) differentiation of different forms of 
aggression and violence. That is, Galtung differentiates between structural violence- 
causing people harm by preventing them from meeting their basic needs - and direct 
violence- where conflicting groups repeatedly aggress against each other physically. 




Based on this differentiation, we tested our predictions by operationalizing 




One-hundred and sixty-one Israeli Jews (84 women and 77 men) were 
recruited through advertisements in various social media, using a convenience 
sampling method. Data of all participants were retained and used for the analysis 
resulting in zero exclusion. Ranging in age between 20 and 68 (M = 27.67), the 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions of high (n = 75) 
versus low (n = 86) threat. Our power analysis indicated (based on an a priori 
statistical power analysis using G*Power version 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) that the model we intended to test required a sample size of N = 128 to 
detect medium-sized effects, f = .25 (Cohen, 1988) with 80% power and an alpha 
level of .05 (two-tailed). Thus, we had good power to test our key predictions.  
Procedure 
Participants were invited to complete an online survey about intergroup 
relations between Jews in Israel and Palestinians. In order to manipulate threat, 
participants in the high-threat condition were instructed in the following way: 
“describe in your own words what you remember and how you felt, from a 
recent security situation in which you experienced threat  (such as the 2014 Gaza War 
also called “Operation Protective Edge”, or the 2008-9 Gaza War, “Operation Cast 
Lead”, or any other military operation), and how this situation affected your daily life, 
your family and Israelis as a group”.  




In contrast, participants in the low-threat condition were asked to “please try 
to recall a security situation in which you did not feel threatened or endangered and 
how this situation did not affect your daily life, your family and Israelis as a group”.   
Measures 
Following the realistic threat manipulation, participants filled out a series of 
measures, using a 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree).  
Manipulation check for Threat. To assess the effect of manipulation of realistic 
threat, participants indicated their agreement, on a 7-point scale, with the statements: 
(a) “following the recollection of that specific incident, to what extent you felt then 
that your life was in danger?”; and (b) “following the recollection of that specific 
incident, to what extent you experienced then stress and mental fatigue?” Although 
items were correlated (r = .701, p < .001), we examined the effect of the threat 
manipulation separately for each. We did so because, on face-value, the first item 
measured the impact of the manipulation on realistic threat more directly, whereas the 
second item focused more specifically on tapping psychological threat¹.  
Competitive victimhood. Adapted from Shnabel et al. (2013), ten items on 7-
point scale measured participants' competitive victimhood. In particular, participants 
were instructed, “indicate your agreement with the statement that Jews in Israel 
suffered greater injustice compared to Palestinians with regard to: physical suffering, 
number of casualties, psychological trauma, emotional pain, human rights, dignity, 
threats to their safety, stigma, economic loss, and political isolation”. Ratings were 
averaged to obtain a single measure of Competitive Victimhood (CV; Cronbach’s 
α=.94), with higher scores reflecting more engagement in CV.  
Justification of structural violence against Palestinians. Participants, on 7-
point scale, were instructed, “please indicate to what extent you endorse and justify 




the following actions”  (a) actions that could disrupt Palestinians’ daily lives, (b) 
actions that would require organizations such as the Red Cross to take action, (c) 
stricter inspections at checkpoints, (d) restrictions on maritime transportation, (e) 
imposing a total maritime closure, (f) imposing restrictions on supplying electricity, 
(g)restricting commerce, (h) restricting free movement in Palestinian areas, (i) house 
demolitions, (j) and banning demonstrations. These items were created based on the 
real-life punitive measures that Palestinians have endured, for example, in Gaza 
(B’Tselem, 2017). Ratings for all ten items were averaged to obtain a single measure 
of level of justification for structural violent actions against Palestinians with higher 
scores reflecting more justification (Cronbach’s α=.95).  
Justification of direct violence against Palestinians. Participants were 
asked, “report your agreement with the following statements”. The three statements 
represented severe, direct violent actions taken by Israeli forces against Palestinians 
(“Military action that could cause injuries”; “Military action that could cause loss of 
human life”; and “ Military action that could cause anxiety and PTSD reactions 
among civilians”). Similar to the structural violence actions, these items were created 
based on the real-life punitive measures that Palestinians have endured, for example, 
in Gaza (B’Tselem, 2017). Ratings for all three items were averaged to obtain a single 
measure of justification of direct violent actions against Palestinians with higher 
scores reflecting greater endorsement of such actions (Cronbach’s α=.95).  
Next, participants indicated their ethnicity, gender, age and political 
orientation; they were then thanked and debriefed.  
Results 
In order to examine the main effect of the realistic threat manipulation on the 
dependent measures, we conducted a series of the independent t-tests.  





Threat manipulation check. Supporting the manipulation of realistic threat, 
analysis revealed that participants in the high realistic threat condition agreed more 
strongly to the statement that their personal safety was endangered than did 
participants in the low realistic threat condition, Mhigh_threat = 3.64 (SD = 1.34) vs. 
Mlow_threat = 2.16 (SD = 1.65), t(159) = 6.15, p = .001, d = .98, 95% CIs [2.58, 3.11]. 
Further and as intended, participants assigned to the high realistic threat condition 
experienced greater stress than participants in the low realistic threat condition, M 
high_threat  = 4.81 (SD = 1.67) vs. Mlow_threat = 2.61 (SD = 1.85), t(159) = 8.58, p = .001, 
d = 1.24, 95% CIs [3.32, 3.93].   
Main Analysis 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations of key 
variables.  
Competitive victimhood. As expected, an independent t-test revealed that 
participants in the high realistic threat condition engaged significantly more in CV 
than did participants in the low realistic threat condition, Mhigh_threat s = 4.12 (SD = 
1.30) vs. Mlow_threat = 3.41 (SD = 1.54), t(159) = 3.10, p = .002, d = .49, 95% CIs 
[3.51, 3.97].   
Justification of structural violence. As predicted, analysis also revealed that 
participants in the high realistic threat condition endorsed structural violent actions 
significantly more than did participants in the low realistic threat condition, Mhigh_threat  
= 4.50 (SD = 1.40) vs. M low_threat = 3.95 (SD = 1.56), t(159) = 2.30, p = .023, d = .36. 
95% CIs [3.97, 4.44].   
Justification of direct violence. Analysis revealed that there was no 
significant main effect of the threat manipulation on endorsing direct violent actions, 




Mhigh_threat  = 2.73 (SD = 1.71) vs. M low_threat = 2.72 (SD = 1.88), t(159) = .046, p = 
.964, d = .01, 95% CIs [2.45, 3.01].   
Mediational Analysis  
Next, using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012; Model 4), we tested for the 
hypothesized indirect path from the independent variable of threat, with the high (vs. 
low) realistic threat condition predicting increased engagement in CV (the proposed 
mediator), and this increased engagement in CV predicting  greater support for 
structural violence against Palestinians (the dependent variable in the model; see 
Figure 1). The results of a bootstrapping mediation analysis (10,000 resamples) 
revealed, as predicted, the indirect effect of the realistic threat manipulation on 
support for structural violence against Palestinians through increased engagement in 
CV, β = .47 (SE = .15), CI95 = [0.191, 0.786] (i.e., zero was not included in the 95% 
confidence interval).  
Although no main condition effect was observed on endorsing and justifying 
direct violent actions, in an exploratory analysis (see Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) 
we examined  the sequence in which induced threat (independent variable) would 
increase engagement in CV, which in turn would increase participants’ support for 
direct violence against Palestinians (the dependent variable; see Figure 2). The results 
of a bootstrapping mediation analysis (10,000 resamples) revealed the indirect effect 
of the realistic threat manipulation on support for direct war actions, through CV 
engagement, β = .42 (SE = .14), CI95 = [0.160, 0.750] (i.e., zero was not included in 
the 95% confidence interval)2.  
Discussion 
Building on Noor and colleagues (2012) theorizing, the present research 
identified and tested realistic threat as a potent antecedent of intergroup competitive 




victimhood. We reasoned that high-power groups would be motivated to compete 
with their low-power adversarial groups over their share of suffering following the 
salience of high (vs. low) realistic threat. The present findings lend support for this 
line of reasoning in the regional violent conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. 
That is, as hypothesized, when Israeli-Jewish participants recalled a situation in which 
they felt endangered due to the ongoing regional war (vs. recalling a security situation 
in which they did not feel threatened), participants were more motivated to engage in 
CV and justify structural (but not direct) violence. Evidence was also found in support 
of CV mediating the relationship between threat and justification of structural 
violence on the one hand. Moreover, we also observed an indirect (but not total) effect 
between participant’s threat perceptions and their justification for direct violence via 
CV. These results constitute an important contribution to the literature in that they not 
only integrate different disparate literatures (threat, competitive victimhood, and 
power/status) but also highlight the importance of realistic threat which to-date has 
not received sufficient attention in studies focusing on CV. Moreover, to our 
knowledge, past research has mainly focused on identifying CV’s psychological 
consequences for intergroup relations and has therefore neglected to investigate its 
potential antecedents (for exceptions see a correlational study conducted in Kosovo 
by Andrighetto, Mari, & Volpato, & Behluli, 2012 and the experimental work conduct 
in the Middle East by Adelman et al., 2016 and Shnabel et al., 2013). The present 
study addressed this gap. Unlike recent research on minority or low-power groups 
reporting that CV reflected a strategic effort to empower and mobilize the ingroup ( 
SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Halabi, 2016), the current research revealed that 
engagement in CV among Israeli Jews was associated with adopting a "helpless 
victim" stance to justify and endorse both structural and direct violent actions against 




the outgroup. By focusing on Israeli Jews, the high-power group, we also explored the 
more counter-intuitive element of competitive victimhood, namely; what motivates 
groups with objectively high-power status to engage in competitive victimhood, such 
competition is understandable and rather intuitive among lower-power groups. 
Another important contribution we make is to provide evidence in support of 
the mediating role of CV in the relationship between realistic threat and aggressions 
toward the outgroup. That is, the presents results revealed that the impact of high (vs. 
low) realistic threat salience on the justification of both structural and direct violent 
actions were facilitated via CV, albeit for the explicit (direct) violent actions such 
effects were indirect. One reason for such indirect effects may have been due to the 
rather explicit wording and nature of the violent actions, which participants may have 
been reticent to readily endorse. Nonetheless, our findings revealed that once our 
participants experienced heightened CV due to high threat, they were then even 
willing to endorse direct violence against the outgroup.   Thus, CV appears to play a 
critical role in releasing high power group members from moral constraints to act 
aggressively against the outgroup.   
The present research bears important practical implications for understanding 
the mechanisms maintaining prolonged, violent intergroup conflicts. The current 
study provides important insights into what maintains the cycle of intergroup violence 
from the high-power group’s perspective, namely; heightened realistic threat seems to 
feed the motivation to engage in CV. In turn, fueled CV predicts why Jewish Israelis 
justify in structural and direct punitiveness against Palestinians. Hence, an important 
direction for future research could explore whether acknowledgement of group 
victimization (Vollhardt, Mazur, & Lemahieu, 2014; see also Adelman et al., 2016) 
could guard against the adverse consequences of experienced realistic threat, 




especially given that threat appears to trigger action tendencies (Frijda, 1994; Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989) such as endorsement of harsh punitive actions against 
the outgroup, as shown by the current research. That said, acknowledging of high 
power group’s victimization, for example, by a third party may inadvertently cause 
upset among the low power group, which in turn may lead to further conflict 
escalation.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Whereas the present research focused on showing the impact of realistic threat 
on competitive victimhood, another important direction for future work would be to 
identify the impact of symbolic threat, a concern for group’s values and belief systems 
(Stephan et al., 2008), and the extent to which it may less justify actions of both 
structural and direct violence. 
While the focus in the present research was on high power groups, - because 
of the more counterintuitive nature of high-power groups engaging in CV - future 
research might still fruitfully consider the impact of different types of threat and 
engagement in CV in low power group. It may well be the case that threat may affect 
low-power groups differently in terms of their tendency for competitive victimhood 
and aggression, relative to what we observed in the present study among a high-
powered group. 
In sum, our findings demonstrate that realistic threat can serve as a potent 
antecedent of feeling vulnerable and therefore wanting to engage in competitive 
victimhood, even if one’s group objectively belongs to the high-power group within 
the intergroup conflict. Fueled with CV, high power group members deem structural 
and direct violent actions against the low-power group members as legitimate, thereby 
contributing their share to maintaining the vicious cycle of violence. Unless the 




mechanisms of this cycle–such as CV–are better understood, the possibility to foster a 
climate of reconciliation, in which compassion and empathy between conflicting 
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1. Collapsing these two items into a composite scale did not alter the conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the manipulation that were drawn from treating these 
items separately, i.e., Mhigh threat = 4,22 (SD = 1.26) vs. Mlow-threat = 2.38 (SD = 
1.52), t(159) = 8.25, p = .001, d = 1.31.  
2. We also tested an alternative indirect path in which threat affects CV 
engagement through greater support for structural and direct violence against 
Palestinians. This model showed that threat had an effect on CV only through 
structural violence, β = .295 (SE = .138), CI95 = [0.015, 0.498], but not for 

























Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Measured Variables. 
 M SD (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Competitive victimhood 3.74 1.47    
(2) Justifications for structural 
violence against Palestinians 
4.21 1.51 **662.
 -  
(3) Justification for direct violence 
against Palestinians 
2.73 1.79 .461** .576** - 
 































Figure 1. Mediation model with threat as the independent variable, increased engagement in 
competitive victimhood as the mediator, and justification for structural violence as the 
dependent variable. Unstandardized regression coefficients (betas) are presented. For the path 
between threat and justification of structural violence, the coefficients shown outside versus 
inside the parentheses represent the total and direct effects, respectively. Coefficients with 
one or two asterisks indicate beta weights’ significance level of *p < .05 or **p < .01, 


























Figure 2. Indirect effect model with threat as the independent variable, increased engagement 
in competitive victimhood as the mediator, and justification for direct violence as the 
dependent variable. Unstandardized regression coefficients (betas) are presented. For the path 
between threat and justification of direct violence, the coefficients shown outside versus 
inside the parentheses represent the total and direct effects, respectively. Coefficients with 
one or two asterisks indicate beta weights’ significance level of **p < .01, respectively. The 
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